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INDIANA'S SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Indiana Supreme Court has declared in State ex rel. Haskett v.
Marion Criminal Court' that proceedings under the Indiana Criminal
Sexual Psychopathic Persons statute2 are civil in nature, that the
statutory grant of immunity' adequately protects the accused from
subsequent conviction resulting from disclosure of self-incriminating
evidence, and that the statute is not unconstitutional. However, the
United States Supreme Court4 and the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit' have declared similar statutes of Colorado and Pennsylvania
to be criminal in nature, lacking the protections of due process of law'
as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and therefore
unconstitutional. The purpose of this comment is to explore the effect
of these decisions on the Indiana statute.
II. THE FACTS IN THE HASKETT CASE
AND THE INDIANA STATUTE
By affidavit, David Haskett was charged with "peeping in house"
in November, 1961, and within three days the prosecuting attorney filed
a petition alleging the defendant's criminal sexual psychopathy.7 Pur-
suant to court order, the defendant was subjected to examination by two
physicians which included physical examinations and laboratory studies,
observation by the staff of the Marion County General Hospital, and
psychiatric interviews. In the report submitted to the court, the physicians
related information obtained from the defendant regarding, inter alia, the
1. - Ind.- , 234 N.E.2d 636 (1968).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3401 to 3410 (Burns 1956 Repl.), as amended (Burns
Supp. 1968).
3. The reports of the psychiatrists assigned to examine the accused to determine
whether he is a sexual psychopath "shall not be considered to be competent evidence in
any other proceeding filed against the accused." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404a (Burns
Supp. 1968).
4. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
5. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966). See
Commonwealth v. Dooley, 209 Pa. Super. 519, 232 A.2d 45 (1967) in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Gerchman decision.
6. The elements of due process discussed in these two decisions were the rights to
counsel, to a full hearing, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to
offer evidence, and the requirement that the court state its findings and conclusions in
order to make meaningful an appeal. For a discussion of the Specht and Gerchinan
decisions see Part V infra.
7. The information related in this paragraph was obtained from the records of the
Marion Criminal Court, Division One, and one of the attorneys for the relator, Forrest
B. Bowman, Jr.
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events leading to his present arrest,' and stated their opinion that he was a
criminal sexual psychopath.' On the basis of this report, a hearing was
conducted during which the defendant was not represented by counsel
and which resulted in his commitment to the Central State Hospital
where he received psychiatric tests and examinations. A report con-
taining the opinion of the hospital staff that the defendant was a criminal
sexual psychopath ' was submitted to the court; whether a hearing occur-
red at that time is unknown." The defendant was committed to the Indi-
ana Division of Mental Health with no indication in the record of findings
of fact and conclusions of law.' In July, 1967, the court granted the
defendant's belated motion for a new trial on the ground that he had not
been represented by counsel in the hearing which resulted in his com-
mitment for diagnosis and observation. Again, the prosecuting attorney
filed a petition under the statute, resulting in a court order requiring the
defendant to be examined by two physicians and "to answer all questions
put to him by said physicians, and each of them."'" Upon the court's
denial of the defendant's motion to strike this clause from the order, the
defendant sought a writ of mandate from the Indiana Supreme Court to
compel the lower court to strike the clause on the ground that it violated
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court
denied the writ. 4
8. It is reasonable to assume that this evidence, obtained from the defendant him-
self, was at least partially the basis upon which the court found him to be a criminal
sexual psychopath. Haskett thus incriminated himself. See the discussion in Part VI
entitled "Self-Incrimination."
9. Although the statute requires that the physicians render an opinion regarding
the accused's psychopathy, this conclusion is one of law ultimately to be decided by the
court. This is not a conclusion of fact, since there is no actual psychological classification
corresponding to "criminal sexual psychopathic person" and the statute's definition, not
based upon fact, is thus a legal definition. See text accompanying note 32 infra. Thus,
a physician is compelled to take the role of judge when he is required to place an
individual within a classification of persons defined by law. This situation can be com-
pared to the use of conclusive statements of experts when the issue is a criminal de-
fendant's insanity. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has
held that psychiatrists are prohibited from testifying as to the ultimate issue of insanity
and their testimony is limited to a description of the defendant's mental state. Washing-
ton v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967). If this holding were applied to the
Indiana sexual psychopath statute, the physicians would be limited to an explanation of
the accused's mental disorder; and the prosecuting attorney would have the burden of
proving the accused's criminal propensities to the commission of sex crimes. Thus, the
ultimate decision of whether an accused is a criminal sexual psychopath would be left
to the court.
10. See discussion note 9 supra.
11. The statute does not explicitly require a hearing prior to the final decision of
the court. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
12. Written findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required by the statute.
13. Court order issued by the Honorable John T. Davis, Judge, Marion Criminal
Court, Division One, on July 20, 1967.
14. See text following note 126 infra for discussion of the Supreme Court's
opinion. Judge Jackson declared in his dissent that regardless of the "euphemistic
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The Indiana statute provides that so long as sentencing has not
occurred, criminal sexual psychopath proceedings may be initiated after
a person is charged with, convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to any
criminal offense except murder, manslaughter and statutory rape.1" If
it "appear[s] that such person is a criminal sexual psychopathic person
. . .," the prosecuting attorney or the defendant may file a petition setting
forth the facts which tend to prove the psychopathy of the defendant.16
Presumably, the facts necessary are that the offender is over sixteen
years of age and "suffering from a mental disorder [excluding insanity
and feeblemindedness]. . . coupled with criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses .. "1" If the prosecuting attorney files this
petition, the court must order a "personal examination" of the accused
by "two qualified physicians" ;1" but if the accused files, the court may
exercise its discretion in ordering an examination." During the examina-
tion, the accused is granted statutory immunity in lieu of his privilege
characterization" of the proceedings, and because one may be deprived of his liberty
against his will for an indefinite time, the constitutional safeguards applicable in
criminal proceedings must be made available to the defendant. In Judge Jackson's view
the statute suffers from the following defects: it creates an arbitrary classification of
persons by excluding those charged with murder, manslaughter and statutory rape since
persons so charged may be suffering from the mental defects for which the statute
provides treatment; the statute is vague regarding to "whom it shall appear" that the
defendant is a criminal sexual psychopath; the guarantee in Art. 1, § 19 of the Indiana
Constitution of jury trial for criminal defendants is violated; the defendant's right to
know definitely the charge he is to meet is abrogated (Art. 1, § 13) ; and the require-
ment that a defendant's guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is avoided by
incarceration without conviction of a crime. State ex rel. Haskett v. Marion Criminal
Court, -Ind.-, 234 N.E.2d 636 (1968) (dissent).
15. The Indiana statute dealing with rape distinguishes between rape on a female
child under the age of sixteen years, for which the penalty is two to twenty-one years
imprisonment, and rape on a female child under the age of twelve years, for which the
penalty is life imprisonment. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4201 (Burns 1956 Repl.) The
exclusions listed in the psychopath statute refer only to "rape on a female child under
the age of twelve." IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
16. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.). The filing of the petitions is
comparable to an affidavit or complaint charging someone with a crime. See text
accompanying notes 93 and 94 infra for further discussion.
17. It is presumed that these are the necessary facts since the quoted statement
is the definition of a criminal sexual psychopathic person found in IND. ANN. STAT. §
9-3401 (Burns 1956 Repl.), and since there is no other indication in the statute of the
facts which constitute proof of psychopathy.
18. The statute does not require psychiatric expertise of the examining physicians.
Usually, these physicians are general practitioners. Cohen, Administration of the
Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute in Indiana, 32 IND. L.J. 450 (1957).
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(a) (Burns Supp. 1968). By requiring the court to
initiate the proceedings when the prosecuting attorney files a petition and allowing the
court to exercise its discretion when the defendant files a petition, the legislature may
have intended to preclude a defendant's claiming the statute as a defense (similar to the
insanity defense) in order to avoid being incarcerated in a prison. In State ex rel.
Savery v. Marion Criminal Court, 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d 128 (1955) the court, in
order to affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's petition, stated that the statute
cannot be claimed as a right similar to other defenses.
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against self-incrimination." If the physicians' reports are in "legal
form,"'" and if both physicians conclude that the accused is a sexual
psychopath, a hearing will be set at which the judge will "examine the
witnesses under oath."22 Upon the court's finding that the accused is
"probably" a criminal sexual psychopath,2 8 he will be committed to a
state psychiatric institution for a period not to exceed sixty days, at the
end of which time the superintendent of the institution is to file with
the court the "findings, conclusions and recommendations of the psychiat-
ric staff."24 If, in this report, the staff "concludes that the accused person
is a criminal sexual psychopath, the court shall then determine the ques-
tion of the psychopathy of the accused... ;,,5 and if the court confirms the
staff's conclusion, the accused will be committed to the division of mental
health to be confined "in an appropriate state psychiatric institution
until such person shall have fully and permanently recovered from such
psychopathy."20 The release is controlled by the court which, upon
petition by the accused and through utilization of reports of yearly
examinations, decides the question of full and permanent recovery.'
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROBLEM
One question posed by the statute arises from the need for com-
pliance with the standards embodied in the equal protection clause of the
20. See note 3 supra. See the discussion in Part VI entitled "Self-Incrimination."
21. The statute offers no definition of this term.
22. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(c) (Bums Supp. 1968). See the discussion in Part
VI entitled "Due Process and the Hearing."
23. This finding by the court may be compared to the finding of "probable cause"
in the preliminary examination under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5(c), and to
the decision of a magistrate under IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-704a (Burns 1956 Repl.) of
whether to hold for trial a person accused of a crime. See text accompanying notes 93
and 94, infra for further discussion.
24. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1968).
25. The statute is silent regarding the burden necessary to prove the accused's
sexual psychopathy. It may be argued that since the statute is considered civil, the
burden is a "preponderance of the evidence" although, since the statute, if it must be
labeled, is more like a criminal statute, the burden should be "beyond a reasonable
doubt." That experienced judges may differ in their interpretations of a statute which
does not state the requisite burden of proof is illustrated by the fact that two judges
questioned by this writer interpreted the statute differently. One stated that the test
should be "beyond a reasonable doubt." The other stated that since the statute requires
a finding of "probable" criminal sexual psychopathy in the first hearing, this is all that
is necessary; the final decision of the court should coincide with the conclusion of the
psychiatric staff's report.
26. See note 24 supra. The statute provides no instructions regarding the procedure
subsequent to a staff report which concludes that the accused is not a criminal sexual
psychopath. The statute does not indicate, but it may be assumed from the wide discre-
tion given the trial judge in the Indiana Supreme Court cases, (see text accompanying
note 138 infra), that the judge has the discretion to find that an accused is not a criminal
sexual psychopath, regardless of the staff report.
27. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3408 (Burns 1956 Repl.). The statutory method has
apparently been supplemented by an administrative parole procedure whereby a patient
may be paroled indefinitely without a court order, subject only to periodic examinations.
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fourteenth amendment: the class of persons covered by the statute must
be a valid classification and the statute must be applied equally to those
within its scope.
Criminal sexual psychopathic persons are defined by the statute in
the following manner: persons who are sixteen years of age or more,
have a mental disorder and criminal propensities to the commission of
sex offenses, excluding both the insane or feebleminded and persons
charged with murder, manslaughter, or statutory rape.2" Thus, the line
that the statute draws between persons who are and those who are not
criminal sexual psychopaths is between persons having a minimum age,
a mental disorder, and criminal propensities, and those who have none of
these characteristics or who possess these characteristics but also are
within the groups excluded-insane or feebleminded persons and persons
charged with murder, manslaughter or statutory rape. The questions to
be answered in appraising the validity of the classification are whether
it treats similarly persons who are similarly situated and whether there
is a reasonable relation between it and the statute's purpose.29
The Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma" held that because the
Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act allowed persons twice-
convicted of larceny to be sterilized but excluded persons twice-convicted
of embezzlement and because the nature of the two crimes is intrinsically
the same, the statute treated dissimilarly persons who were similarly
situated and thus violated the equal protection clause. The Indiana statute
contains a seemingly comparable defect. For example, two persons may
be sixteen years or over and have mental disorders coupled with criminal
propensities to the commission of sex offenses; if one is charged with
sodomy and the other with statutory rape, the former individual is within
the statutory classification but the latter is not. This constitutes unequal
treatment of persons similarly situated and, according to Skinner, seem-
ingly violates the equal protection clause.
28. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3401, 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
29. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 346 (1949) ; Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State
Penal Laws, 61 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1103, 1116 (1961).
30. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court's mechanical application of the equal protection
clause to the Oklahoma statute must be read in the context of the Court's statements
regarding the fundamental nature of the right of procreation and the irreparable effects
of the state's experimentation with sterilization of habitual criminals. It seems, then,
that the Court's opinion was affected by the severe treatment imposed upon those within
the scope of the statute. Similarly, a court may consider the drastic effects of the
Indiana psychopath statute, such as confinement without adequate treatment facilities
and the possibility of life confinement subsequent to a charge of a minor offense.
Furthermore, the courts have displayed a willingness to apply the equal protection clause
to cases involving criminal procedure. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353




In addition the validity of the classification is determined by its
reasonableness in relation to the purpose of the statute. If the purpose of
the statute is to find persons with mental disorders who are likely to
commit sex offenses and either cure them or indeterminately confine
them,3' then exclusion of the insane and feebleminded and exclusion of
persons charged with murder, manslaughter or statutory rape may be
unreasonable. Psychiatrists and psychologists criticize criminal sexual
psychopath statutes for attempting to define a class of persons which,
they say, cannot be defined because it does not exist. 2 That a sexually
deviant person may commit non-sex offenses and that a severely men-
tally disturbed person, whose disturbance is not due to sexual deviation,
may commit a sex offense 3 are illustrative of the fact that "there are a
variety of psychiatric conditions and dynamic factors which go into
producing any one of the sexual offenses."3 " Thus, arguably there is
little reason to exclude insane persons from the statute because frequently
"a sex offense may be the symptom of psychosis. As a matter of fact,
nearly every variety of insanity may have this type of misconduct as a
symptom." 5 And, it may be unreasonable to exclude persons charged
with murder or manslaughter 6 because some offenses "appear entirely
disassociated from the sex impulse but . . . in actuality, are in many
instances sexually motivated."3
Even though a classification may exclude some persons whom,
arguably, it should cover, a number of Supreme Court cases indicate
that the Court will defer to legislative judgment in describing a class
except when the class is drawn on the lines of race, color or creed. 3
The Court has stated that "[t]he legislature may select one phase of one
31. See text accompanying notes 47 & 48 infra.
32. E.g., M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 227 (1951); Guttmacher & Weihofen,
Sex Offenses, 43 J. Clim. L.C. & P.S. 153 (1952); Hacker & Frym, The Sexual
Psychopath Act in Practice, 43 CALIF. L. RLv. 776 (1955); Kramman, Evolution of
Sexual Psychopath Laws, 6 J. FoR. Sci. 170 (1961).
33. Sadoff, Sexually Deviated Offenders, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 305, 313 (1967).
34. Id.
35. Guttmacher & Weihofen, Sex Offenses, 43 J. Cnnm. L.C. & P.S. 153, 156(1952).
36. The exclusion of statutory rape is discussed in the text following note 30 supra.
37. See Guttmacher & Weihofen, supra note 35, at 162.
38. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552 (1947), involved distinctions not based on race, color or creed and the Court
held that the classifications were reasonably related to the purposes of the statutes.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950) are examples of discrimination on the basis of race which the Court
held to be violative of the equal protection clause. Distinctions on the basis of nationality
have been held valid in some cases, e.g., Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914)
and McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) and invalid in others, e.g, Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Comm'rs 334 U.S. 410 (1948) and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others . . . [because]
... [t]he prohibition of the equal protection clause goes no further than
the invidious discrimination."3 Thus, it is likely that a court would find
the classification reasonably related to the purpose of the statute by
saying that it is reasonable to exclude the insane and feebleminded
because they can be handled in civil commitment proceedings and that
it is reasonable to exclude persons charged with murder, manslaughter or
statutory rape because they are dangerous persons and should not be
incarcerated in mental institutions where they may inflict injury on other
patients.
The equal protection clause also may be violated if, in the adminis-
tration of a statute, persons who come within the statute's scope are
treated differently. The then Chief Justice Emmert in his concurring
opinion in State ex rel. Savery v. Marion Criminal Court" explained
the possibility of unequal application under the provisions of the Indiana
statute. The court must initiate psychopathy proceedings when a pros-
ecuting attorney files a petition and the court has discretion in initiating
the proceedings when the defendant files a petition. 1 The Chief Justice,
while accepting criminal sexual psychopathic persons as a valid classi-
fication,42 argued that where cohorts in crime are suffering equally from
sexual psychopathy, one may be brought within the statute by the
prosecuting attorney's filing a petition and the other may be excluded
from the statute by the prosecuting attorney's refusal to file a petition
or by the court's refusal to initiate proceedings subsequent to the defend-
ant's filing a petition, and unequal application of the laws is the result.
The weakness in this argument is that typically it is within the discretion
of the prosecuting attorney to determine whom and in what manner he
will prosecute and it is typically within the court's power to grant or
deny petitions and motions.43 However, if it can be shown that in the
exercise of discretion the prosecuting attorney and the court systematically
apply the statute to one group and exclude another, the equal protection
clause will invalidate such an abuse.44 Evidence which indicates sys-
tematic discrimination in the application of the Indiana statute will be
39. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). See also Patsone v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914) in which the Court stated that "[ilt is not
enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if,
as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named."
40. 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d 128 (1955) (concurring opinion).
41. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404 (Bums Supp. 1968).
42. See text accompanying notes 32 to 37 supra.
43. Comment, supra note 29, at 1107, 1119.
44. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also Edleman v. California,
344 U.S. 357; Comment, supra note 29, at 1113.
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discussed in part VII.4 1
Nevertheless, a statute could be drafted which would avoid the
basic equal protection problem. Since the underlying purpose is to
decrease the number of sex crimes, to be legally valid the classification
should consist of persons who have committed enumerated sex crimes ;41
application of the statute would require conviction of one of the enumer-
ated crimes. This statutory scheme would avoid reliance upon a non-
existent psychological classification of persons. In any event, regardless
of the present statute's vulnerability to an equal protection attack, the
following discussion should reveal several major objections which rest
on clearly unassailable ground.
IV. THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DICHOTOMY
AND THE RIGHT To TREATMENT
The forces which prompted enactment of criminal sexual psychopath
statutes were public rage and fear following highly publicized, brutal
sex crimes, 47 and the reasoned demands of lawyers and psychiatrists for
remedial treatment of the sex offender.4 8 These forces are reflected in
the Indiana statute's provision for periodic psychiatric examinations and
indefinite sentences.49 Thus, a person can be committed under one, or
two, theories of governmental power: the police power, the function of
which is protection of society; and parens patriae, the function of which
is treatment and rehabilitation of sick persons. Civil commitments of
persons deemed insane usually are based upon similar considerations:
mental illness plus dangerousness to others or self or mental illness
plus the need for treatment."0 Thus, it has been argued, commitments
under the criminal sexual psychopath statute are civil in nature and do
not require due process safeguards of notice, hearing, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses and right to counsel found in criminal
proceedings."
45. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
46. Certainly the crimes enumerated should be the more serious sex offenses.
47. Cohen, supra note 18, at 450. Dramman, Evolution of Sexual Psychopath
Laws, 6 J. FOR. Sci. 170 (1961).
48. Hacker & Frym, supra note 32.
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1968); § 9-3408 (Burns 1956
Repl.). Similarly the Pennsylvania and Colorado statutes state that their purposes are
"the better administration of justice and the more efficient punishment, treatment and
rehabilitation of persons convicted. . ." of certain sex crimes. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §
39-19-1 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166 (1952).
50. Marx v. State, 236 Ind. 455, 141 N.E.2d 126 (1957); Note, Civil Restraint,
Mental Illhess, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967) ; Note, Civil Coon-
initment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HAav. L. Rav. 1288 (1966).
51. See, e.g., State ex rel Haskett v. Marion Criminal Court, -Ind. -, 234 N.E.2d
636 (1968); State ex rel Savery v. Marion Criminal Court, 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d
120 (1955).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Aside from the fact that this argument proves too much since
arguably these two theories, as a practical matter, parallel those used to
justify all criminal punishment, 2 the argument fails to consider the fact
that denial of due process safeguards in civil commitment proceedings is
not universally accepted. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that a
civil commitment statute which did not require notice and hearing prior
to commitment was violative of due process and thus unconstitutional;"3
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has held void a civil
commitment based upon a hearing at which the petitioner was not
represented by counsel;" and the New York Court of Appeals has
required counsel to be appointed for a civilly committed person seeking a
writ of habeas corpus.55
The medical profession generally contends that civil commitment
proceedings must be flexible and informal and devoid of the require-
ments of notice or a hearing at which the allegedly "insane" person must
be present, because legal proceedings, with the connotations of criminality
which surround them, will have a traumatic effect upon an already
deluded and unstable person." Such reasoning, however, need not apply
to persons brought within the psychopath statutes because "insane"6
persons are excluded from these proceedings; the criminal sexual psy-
chopath would apparently require less shielding. The situation most
favorable to a psychopathic person, who supposedly is not out of touch
with reality, is clearly not an informal proceeding in which notice, hearing
and other safeguards can be dispensed with, but a formal proceeding in
52. The other traditional reasons for imposing criminal sanctions have been retri-
bution and deterrence. However, modern theories reject the notion that persons should be
incarcerated for revenge, and punishment's deterrent effect is being debated. Wechsler,
The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1103, 1104 (1952).
Article 18 of the Indiana Constitution embraces the modern approach: "The penal code
shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not vindictive justice." More-
over, the Model Penal Code includes in its purposes governing the sentencing and
treatment of offenders the following: "to prevent the commission of offenses [which
may include deterrence] .. . [and] to promote the correction and rehabilitation of
offenders." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (a) (b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961).
The Code excludes retribution from its list of purposes.
53. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954); contra,
In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1961).
54. Dooling v. Overholster, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
55. People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d
537 (1966). See also In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1958), affd, Overholser
v. Williams, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958), in which the court found that where proce-
dures required by the civil commitment statute were avoided, the civil proceedings
violated due process.
56. Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process,"
21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28 (1960); Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment
Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 383 (1962); Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill,
50 MIcH. L. Rxv. 837 (1952); Note, District of Columbia Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1062 (1965).
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which his logical expectations of constitutional protection will be realized.
Furthermore, the suggestion has been made that a realistic approach
to commitment procedures would yield a distinction not between civil and
criminal proceedings but between voluntary and involuntary confine-
ment.57 Commitment to a "hospital" against one's will is comparable to
commitment to a "jail," regardless of the laudable motives of officials
who seek commitment, because loss of liberty does not vary with place
of confinement. Loss of liberty against one's will is, then, the real
issue : As the Supreme Court asserted in In re Gault while discussing
commitment of a "juvenile delinquent," "commitment is a deprivation of
liberty. It is incarceration against one's will whether it is called 'criminal'
or 'civil.' ""
Obviously, mere confinement under civil commitment and psycho-
path statutes affords society protection but a question remains as to the
existence and efficacy of remedial treatment. While some courts refuse
to recognize a right to treatment,8" other courts have considered evidence
of lack of adequate treatment facilities and have held that treatment
means confinement, not with criminals or the criminally insane, but in
separate facilities ;61 and that the absence of treatment cannot be justified
on the basis of inadequate facilities or staff." However, these decisions
fail to take the additional logical step of concluding that due process is
nonetheless essential despite the right to remedial treatment ;3 they refuse
57. Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 183, 197
(1958).
58. Commitment under the criminal sexual psychopath statute constitutes loss of
liberty against one's will because even when an accused attempts to rely upon the pro-
visions of the statute, he would do so probably because it would seem the less severe
of two alternative confinements, both of which would be effectuated against his will.
59. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
60. People ex rel. Anonymous v. LaBurt, 14 A.D.2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup.
Ct. 1961). Articles advocating a right to treatment are Birnbaum, The Right to Treat-
inent, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960) ; Note, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for
Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. C. L. Rzv. 633 (1967). In order to
enforce this right, courts would be called upon to review the procedures in institutions
for the care and discipline of the patients. In doing so, the courts, step by step, would be
setting down the basic factors constituting a right to treatment. Thus, the public, the
political authorities, and the authorities in charge of mental institutions would be
compelled to fulfill the treatment purposes of the statutes. See also as an indication of
the courts' inchoate willingness to review treatment, the recent decisions holding that
the conditions in "strip cells" which are used for solitary confinement constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Calif. 1966); cf. Landman v. C.C. Peyton, 370 F.2d
135 (4th Cir. 1966) ; contra, Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1967).
61. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Commonwealth v. Page,
339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959).
62. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
63. E.g., "[A] confinement in a prison which is undifferentiated from the
incarceration of convicted criminals is not remedial so as to escape Constitutional
requirements of due process." Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 317, 159 N.E.2d
82, 85 (1959).
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to recognize that involuntary confinement, regardless of the place or
facilities, constitutes taking away one's liberty within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment.6"
The Indiana Supreme Court has not considered the question of the
right to treatment of persons committed under the psychopath statute;
and, although the statute does not explicitly provide for remedial treat-
ment, that treatment is intended in the statutory plan may reasonably be
implied since the offender is committed to the Division of Mental Health
to be assigned to a state psychiatric institution in which he must remain
until "fully and permanently recovered."6 One would expect "full and
64. The holding of the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), discussing the treatment and punishment of persons convicted of crimes, has an
effect upon the right to treatment under psychopath statutes. The Court limited the
scope of criminal punishment by stating that a person cannot be punished for a "status"
(in the Robinson case, drug addiction) but that a state may compel remedial treatment
in an attempt to cure his anti-social "status." The Robinson decision has been limited by
the decision in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) in which the Court held that,
although a person cannot be punished for a "status," he can be punished for a status-
directed act, such as public drunkenness. Applying these two decisions to the Indiana
statute, it would seem that when the statute is imposed after a charge of a criminal
offense, the subsequent confinement, being punishment for the status of criminal sexual
psychopathy since there was no proof of a criminal act, comes within the Robnison
decision. When the statute is imposed after conviction, it seems that the subsequent
confinement is punishment for the act, and thus, within the Powell decision. However,
it may be argued that even after conviction of a crime, the psychopath statute requires
a new finding of fact in which it is determined whether the convicted person is a
criminal sexual psychopath and that confinement results, not from the commission of the
criminal act, but from a finding that the defendant is a member of the status group.
If so, confinement subsequent to conviction and application of the statute comes within
the Robinson decision as does confinement subsequent to a mere charge and application
of the statute: in neither circumstance can punishment be inflicted because this would
constitute punishment for a status.
However, in order to avoid the Robinson holding some persons will merely label
confinement under the statute "treatment." Obviously, such a statement is suspect,
first, for its failure to consider the realities of confinement in most public mental
institutions and second, because whether deemed "punishment" or "treatment," such
confinement is a loss of liberty against one's will. See text accompanying note 59
supra. Of course, in so far as this argument implies that any confinement against
one's liberty constitutes punishment, it proves too much because if all confinement
against one's liberty is punishment, and since no one can be punished for a status
according to Robinson, then no one can be civilly committed for the status of insanity.
A short resolution of this dilemma is to distinguish between persons afflicted with a
recognized psychiatric maladjustment and persons afflicted with "criminal sexual
psychopathy" which is an arbitrary concept having no basis in medical knowledge.
Calling confinement of persons in the first group "treatment" is more realistic than
calling the confinement of persons in the latter group "treatment" because there can be
no treatment for a non-existent illness. Viewing the matter realistically, the prime effect
of the statute as presently administered seems to be ridding the streets of persons with
criminal tendencies and the Robinson holding could be extended to such a statute with-
out jeopardizing traditional commitment of the mentally ill. Seemingly the "stigma"
of criminal prosecution which represented a determining factor in Robinson would more
readily attach to convictions under the Criminal Sexual Psychopath statute in view of
both the label applied and the realities of the matter.
65. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1968); § 9-3408 (Burns 1956
Repl.).
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permanent recovery" to be effectuated through treatment.
V. THE SPECIT AND GERCMAN CASES
Although the civil-criminal dichotomy frequently is simply a means
of labeling proceedings rather than of looking to their substance, the
Supreme Court in Specht v. Patterson66 and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,6 7 while main-
taining the dichotomy, have taken into consideration the essential features
of the proceedings and have concluded that they are criminal in nature.
In Gerchman the court stated:
It is true that the Act provides for periodic psychiatric and
psychological examinations . . . But it is no less a criminal
proceeding and no less the infliction of criminal punishment
because the Act provides for such studies, especially when this
is accompanied by the drastic potential of life imprisonment if
they do not affirmatively provide a basis for release.6"
In Specht, after the defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime
of indecent liberties, one of the crimes enumerated in the Colorado Sex
Offenders Act,69 the trial court initiated proceedings under that act to
indeterminately confine him. After the reports of a psychological examin-
ation were filed with the court, and with no hearing upon the evidence
contained therein, Specht appeared in court with his lawyer and was
sentenced in 1959 to an indeterminate term in the state penitentiary.70
After the Colorado Supreme Court denied Specht's writ of habeas
corpus in 1963 on the grounds that the Colorado statute was con-
stitutional,7 he was transferred to the Colorado State Hospital." In
1966 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Colorado Supreme
66. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
67. 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
68. Id. at 309.
69. A person came within the scope of the Colorado act if he had been convicted of
one of certain enumerated sex crimes and if, in the opinion of the district court, such
person "if at large, constitute[d] a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or
[was] an habitual offender and mentally ill. . . ." Following such determination, the
district court ordered a "complete psychiatric examination" of the offender and that a
report thereof be filed with the court. Based upon the reports filed the court determined
whether to commit the offender in the "best interests of justice." If the decision was
affirmative, the offender was arraigned before the court and sentenced to an institution
for an indeterminate period of from one day to the end of his natural life, which
sentence was in lieu of that prescribed by the statute under which he was originally
convicted. While in confinement, psychiatric examinations were to be performed periodi-
cally and the reports thereof were to be utilized by the Parole Board which had control
of the release of the offender. CoLo. RFv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 et. seq. (1953).
This statute has since been amended. See text accompanying note 141 infra.
70. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
71. Specht v. Linsley, 153 Colo. 235, 385 P.2d 423 (1963).
72. See note 70 supra.
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Court's denial of habeas corpus, agreeing with that court that the Act
was constitutional. 3 In 1967 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed,74 holding that sentencing under the statute required a new finding
of fact" which could only be determined at a hearing, in which event
"[d]ue process ... requires that [the accused] be present with counsel,
have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against
him, have a right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own." 6
"And," the Court continued, "there must be findings adequate to make
meaningful any appeal that is allowed. ' 77
In Specht the Supreme Court quoted with approval from the opinion
in Gerchman5 which stated that under a Pennsylvania statute79 similar
to that in Specht the relator was denied due process and thus his com-
mitment was void. Although the court in Gerchman was asked to rule
on only a few aspects of due process, such as the right to confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses, the right to a hearing and a jury
trial," the court made it clear that "[a] defendant in such a proceeding
is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due
process guarantees in state criminal proceedings."'" The tenor of the
opinion may be illustrated by the following statement:
The effort of enlightened penology to alleviate the condition
of a convicted defendant by providing some elements of
advanced, modern methods of cure and rehabilitation and pos-
sible ultimate release on parole cannot be turned about so as to
deprive a defendant of the procedures which the due process
clause guarantees in a criminal proceeding."
73. Specht v. Patterson, 375 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1966).
74. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
75. The Court stated that an indeterminate sentence cannot be imposed merely
upon a conviction of an enumerated crime, but that a conviction was the basis for
commencing proceedings under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, and that commitment
under this statute depended upon a finding that the accused "constitutes a threat of
bodily harm . . .to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill .. " COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (1953). Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
76. 386 U.S. at 610.
77. Id.
78. 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966). Gerchman was convicted of assault with intent
to ravish, one of the crimes enumerated in the Pennsylvania statute.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1166-74 (1952). This statute differs from the
Colorado Sex Offenders Act only in minor aspects such as which court has jurisdiction
and the number of days of preliminary commitment during which a psychiatric examina-
tion is performed.
80. Judge Freedman, writing the opinion, stated that if and when the right to ajury trial is applicable to state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth amendment,
it would also be applicable to this statute. The two concurring opinions stated that
because the right to a jury trial is not within the fourteenth amendment, the question of
a jury trial in this case is not a proper one.
81. 355 F.2d at 312. (emphasis added).
82. 355 F.2d at 310.
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Superficially, these decisions seem equally applicable to the Indiana
statute, but it must be noted that in Gerchman the court explicitly
excluded from the purview of its decision the type of statute which
provides for commitment of "sexual psychopaths without requiring a
previous criminal conviction."8 The court thus seems to have excluded
statutes similar to that of Indiana. The court gave no reason for this
exclusion but a possible explanation is that the court assumed that where
the only finding of fact is the accused's psychopathy, this finding would
be more likely to have been made after a full hearing in which due
process safeguards would be protected. If this was the rationale, the
Indiana statute cannot be encompassed within the exclusion because it
does not provide for the finding of fact to be predicated upon a full
hearing in which due process safeguards are guaranteed. Furthermore,
the exclusion may be unwarranted since the effect of these statutes and
the procedures for obtaining that effect are similar. 4
VI. APPLICATIONS OF SPECHT AND GERCHMAN
TO THE INDIANA STATUTE
Due Process and New Finding of Fact
In Specht the Court stated that since the Colorado statute was
applicable if a convicted offender either posed a threat of bodily harm to
the public or was an habitual offender and mentally ill, a determination
of such traits was a new finding of fact. And, by declaring that the first
conviction was only the basis for the commencement of proceedings in
which the new finding of fact would be determined, the Court rejected
83. Id. The Specht Court excluded from the purview of its decision those statutes
which provide for a hearing in which the accused is "represented by counsel and ...
[can] compel the production of witnesses on his behalf." Specht v.-Patterson, 386 U.S.
605, 610 (1967). This exclusion does not cover the Indiana statute because that statute
grants neither a right to counsel nor the right to compulsory service upon witnesses.
See note 86 infra for further discussion of the Gerchman court's exclusion.
84. E.g., People v. Bailey, People v. Leisen, People v. McCraw, 21 N.Y.2d 588,
237 N.E.2d 205, 289 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1968), (application of Specht decision to proceedings
under the New York psychopath statute) ; see People v. Armstrong, 260 Adv. Cal. App.
2d 186, 67 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1968) (a decision under the California psychopath statute must
be made upon the basis of a full hearing-physicians' reports, alone, are not sufficient) ;
Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954) (confined indigent
psychopath has right to a free transcript of the court proceedings as do indigents in
criminal cases) ; also, recognizing the need for application of certain aspects of due
process to the Illinois psychopath statute are: People v. Brucknman, 33 Ill. 2d 150, 210
N.E.2d 537 (1965) (privilege against self-incrimination); People v. English, 201
N.E.2d 455 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); People v. Nastasio, 168
N.E.2d 728 (1960) (right to meet accusers) ; People v. Capoldi, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957)
(confession must be voluntary). See also Note, Plight of the Sexual Psychopath:
A Legislative Bhder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NoTrE DAME LAW. 527 (1966);
Comment, The Validity of the Segregations of the Sexual Psychopath Under the Law,
26 OH Io ST. UJ. 640 (1965).
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the argument of the state that the statute merely provided an alternative
sentence for the first conviction. The Indiana statute provides for com-
mitment based upon a new finding of fact not only after a conviction but
prior to a conviction in which case the statute presents an alternative to
a possible conviction for the crime with which the defendant is charged.
In this latter situation the charge is set aside and proceedings are
conducted under the psychopath statute. Although a criminal charge is
the event which triggers the applicability of the statute, the question of
guilt is made irrelevant by the statute because the only elements necessary
for confinement are a criminal charge plus "a mental disorder coupled
with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses. 85
These circumstances indicate a possible violation of due process
since an accused may be deprived of his liberty, possibly for life, without
proof of guilt of the crime with which he is charged. Since the prosecuting
attorney need not prove the guilt of the accused, the possible misuse of
this procedure becomes obvious.88 It may be noted that in this situation
past convictions of sex offenses may be assumed to constitute proof of a
propensity to commit sex offenses. If the statute is invoked after a
conviction of the crime with which a defendant is charged, the same new
finding of fact is required. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that the
proof of the commission of the offense, if it is a sex offense, may be
considered as evidence of a propensity to commit such offenses.
Due Process and the Hearing
One of the major defects of the Colorado and Pennsylvania statutes,
according to Specht and Gerchman, was the absence of a full hearing in
which to determine the new finding of fact. The extent of the hearing in
both cases was that the defendants appeared in court to be informed of
the sentences imposed; and in Gerchman the defendant learned of
the psychiatric examination report's conclusion that he posed a
threat of bodily harm to the public when the judge read the report
aloud. The Court of Appeals deemed the reading of the report hearsay
evidence and therefore ruled that a commitment could not be based upon
it.8 7 This ruling is equally applicable to the Indiana proceedings when the
examining physicians do not appear as witnesses at the hearing. Although
the Indiana statute provides for a hearing of which the defendant must
85. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3401 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
86. With these factors in mind, it is difficult to agree with the Gerchinan court
when it excluded from the purview of its decision those statutes which require, initially,
no conviction of a criminal offense. See text accompanying note 83 supra. Obviously
the lack of a criminal conviction does not soften the impact of the commitment nor
diminish the deprivation of liberty. In ,re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See text accompany-
ing note 59 supra.
87. United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 1966).
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be notified, the statute fails to grant explicitly to the defendant the rights
of compulsory service of witnesses and of confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses since it grants only to the judge the power to
subpoena witnesses and examine them under oath. Neither does the
statute grant the defendant the right to counsel; nor does the statutory
grant of immunity adequately protect the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination.88 That a hearing may, in fact occur, without the
enforcement of the rights of the accused is illustrated by the Haskett
case in which the accused was not represented by counsel at the hearing. 9
The hearing required by the statute occurs prior to the temporary
commitment of the defendant for "observation, evaluation, and diag-
nosis" by the psychiatric staff.9" After this temporary commitment the
court, based upon the report of the psychiatric staff, "shall then determine
the question of the psychopathy of the accused person and shall enter an
order and judgment in accordance with such finding. . . ."" There is no
provision for a hearing preceding the final determination. It seems that
in practice a second hearing may, or may not, be conducted.92
Aside from the fact that the report of the psychiatric staff constitutes
new evidence which indicates need for a second hearing, comparison of
procedures under the statute with usual criminal procedures may further
illustrate the need for a second hearing. If the filing of a petition can be
compared to a criminal charge, 3 and if the first hearing is comparable to
a determination of probable cause, 4 then a second hearing is as necessary
as a full hearing or trial because it is at this point that all the evidence is
presented to the court to enable it to make a final decision. Obviously the
court's final decision constitutes a new finding of fact; and thus, in the
absence of a second hearing, the accused is denied those aspects of due
process-the right to counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses and the opportunity to submit evidence-which were held in
Specht and Gerchman to be the constitutional requisites lacking in the
Colorado and Pennsylvania statutes.
88. See the discussion of self-incrimination in Part VI.
89. See text following note 9 supra.
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1968).
91. Id.
92. The Office of the Indiana Commissioner of Mental Health reported that a
second hearing is always conducted. However, it was learned that a second hearing may
or may not occur when the proceedings are being conducted in the Monroe County
Courts, and there is no reason to believe that the Monroe County Courts are unusual in
this respect.
93. See the statement at note 16 supra.
94. The statute states that "[ilf... it shall appear to the judge that the person so
alleged to be a criminal sexual psychopath is probably a criminal sexual psychopath,"
then he shall be held for psychiatric examinations. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns
Supp. 1968) (emphasis added). See also note 23 supra.
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Even when a second hearing is conducted, it is possible that the
above enumerated rights will not be protected because the statute is
silent regarding them. In addition, the statute does not require written
findings upon which the court bases its final decision and which the
Supreme Court in Specht required in order "to make meaningful any
appeal that is allowed."9
Self-Incrimination
Since the Specht and Gerchman decisions indicated that all the
aspects of due process which are applicable to state criminal proceedings
must be provided in criminal sexual psychopath proceedings, another
constitutional defect may be discerned in the Indiana statute. During
the physicians' and psychiatric staff's examinations the defendant is
compelled to answer all questions propounded to him under penalty of
contempt of court; but the statute provides that the reports resulting from
these examinations "shall not be considered to be competent evidence in
any other proceeding filed against the accused. . ." except in the psycho-
pathy proceedings." In Malloy v. Hogan" the Supreme Court declared
that the privilege against self-incrimination and the attendant federal
standards are applicable in state criminal proceedings; and the Court,
in In re Gault, stated that "our Constitution guarantees that no person
shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is threatened
with deprivation of his liberty."98  Nonetheless, the Indiana statute
compels testimony from an accused and grants him immunity from
''criminal" prosecutions based upon that testimony even though the
testimony will be used against him to deprive him of his liberty under the
psychopath statute.9 This result is accomplished by labeling the proceed-
ings "civil." The Indiana Supreme Court approved the use of such
handy labels in its averment that "there can be no violation of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination under the Indiana
statute, since the testimony or evidence given is by statute no longer
incrimination."1 ' Quite the contrary, the statute affords little protection:
statutory grant of immunity is a dismally empty gesture when the
proceedings in which the defendant is compelled to give self-incriminating
95. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967). See also Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that a waiver by a juvenile
court of its jurisdiction must be accompanied by "a statement of reasons for the
juvenile court's decisions." And, "[mleaningful review requires that the reviewing court
should review.. . . It should not be remitted to assumptions." 383 U.S. at 561.
96. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(a) (Burns Supp. 1968).
97. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
98. 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
99. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(a) (Burns Supp. 1968).




evidence may result in his confinement for life.'
Possibility of Release
The methods of release in the Indiana and Colorado statutes are
somewhat comparable. The Colorado Parole Board, utilizing all records
and information, including reports of psychiatric examinations of the con-
fined person, decides upon release guided by the "interests of justice."'0 2
A person may be paroled with limitations upon his conduct and recommit-
ted if he violates parole.' Under the Indiana statute the committing
court decides upon release using evidence, including the reports of yearly
examinations of two physicians, relevant to the question of whether the
person confined has "fully and permanently recovered."'0 4 While both
standards are arbitrary, a release dependent upon the "interests of
justice" may be more realistic than a release dependent upon "full and
permanent" recovery: the claim of psychiatrists that "criminal sexual
psychopathic persons" is not a valid classification makes unlikely the
existence of a treatment so successful that a psychiatrist can declare
that his patient has "fully and permanently recovered."'0 5 Thus, in
order for a patient to obtain a release from the court either the examining
101. Even if the proceedings are considered civil in nature a question arises
regarding the constitutionality of the statutory immunity. To be valid, a grant of
immunity must "supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the
constitutional prohibition was designed to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), followed in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In other
words, the protection offered by the immunity must be co-extensive with the protection
the privilege affords. One of the federal standards attendant to the privilege, and one
which has been enunciated by the Indiana Supreme Court, Overman v. State, 194 Ind.
483, 143 N.E. 604 (1924), is that the privilege may be successfully relied upon when an
answer would reveal a "link in the chain of evidence" which could lead to prosecution.
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865, 867
(5th Cir. 1950). Because this standard is an aspect of the privilege, it is also an
adjunct to a grant of statutory immunity. It can be argued that since the immunity
granted in the criminal sexual psychopath statute simply declares compelled testimony
to be incompetent evidence in any other proceeding against the accused, the immunity
does not exclude the possibility that compelled testimony could be used to uncover
related evidence which would be competent in other proceedings against the accused.
The immunity granted, then, may be deemed not commensurate with the privilege, and
thus, invalid. However, it seems quite impossible, in the light of the Specht, Gerchman,
and Gault decisions, to call these proceedings "civil" for the purposes of excluding the
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in GauIt declared that "juvenile pro-
ceedings . . .which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as
'criminal' for the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination." In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
102. CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-6, 7 (1953).
103. Id. § 39-19-7.
104. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3408 (Burns 1956 Repl.); § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp.
1968). See note 27, supra.
105. Elias S. Cohen, Assistant to the Indiana Mental Health Commissioner in
1957, has written that it is impossible for a psychiatrist to know that a patient has
permanently recovered; thus, requiring such a statement results in a relatively ground-
less and arbitrary opinion. Cohen, supra note 18.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
physician who believes that his patient has recovered sufficiently to be
released, but recognizes the possibility of a relapse, must make a statement
of "full and permanent" recovery which is something less than the truth,
or the court must be flexible in applying the statutory standard. Some
courts are loath to do the latter." 6
VII. INDIANA SUPREME COURT CASES
DEALING WITH THE STATUTE
Further understanding of the Indiana statute may be gleaned from
a review of the four Indiana Supreme Court cases which have dealt with
the statute. In State ex rel. Savery v. Marion Criminal Court... the
defendant, charged with robbery and physical injury while committing
robbery, subsequent to filing a defense of insanity filed a petition under
the statute which was denied. Although the two physicians appointed to
examine the defendant pursuant to his filing the insanity defense con-
cluded he was a criminal sexual psychopath, he was convicted and
sentenced for the felony with which he was charged. The defendant in
Wilson v. State,' charged with rape and burglary with intent to commit
a felony (rape), filed a petition which was granted. Disregarding the
two examining physicians' reports that the defendant was a criminal
sexual psychopath, the court found the defendant not to be so afflicted
and proceeded with the original charge, upon which the defendant was
convicted and sentenced. The defendant in Wolfe v. State,' charged
with sodomy, filed a petition and was examined by two physicians who
reported that he was not a criminal sexual psychopath; thus there was
no hearing. During the trial on the original offense the two physicians,
after re-examining the defendant, concluded that if evidence regarding the
defendant's sexual proclivities were true he was a criminal sexual
psychopath;"' ° nonetheless, the defendant was convicted and sentenced
according to the original charge. It should be noted that in Haskett,"'
where the prosecuting attorney filed the petition, the defendant was
charged with "peeping in house," a misdemeanor, and was committed
under the psychopath statute.
In summary, in the three cases in which the defendants charged with
106. Cf. People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 393 (1964).
107. 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d 128 (1955).
108. 236 Ind. 278, 139 N.E.2d 554 (1957).
109. - Ind.- , 219 N.E.2d807 (1966).
110. The circumstances here are illustrative of the difficulty confronting the
examining physicians in classifying persons according to a legal definition which has
little or no basis in psychiatric knowledge. See text accompanying note 32 supra for
a discussion of this problem.
111. - Ind.- , 234 N.E.2d 636 (1968). See Part II supra for the facts in this
case.
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felonies filed petitions to initiate the proceedings, the court denied that
the defendants were psychopaths, contrary to the conclusions of the
examining physicians; all three were convicted on the original charges.
In the one case in which the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor
and the prosecuting attorney filed the petition, the court affirmed the
physicians' conclusions that the defendant was a psychopath. Since there
have been many more petitions filed under the Indiana statute than
these four"2 they are not conclusive, but they may indicate a pattern
of application in which the statute is made available to a prosecuting
attorney where the result will be an enormous increase in the period of
incarceration of a misdemeanant but the statute is not made available to
a defendant charged with a felony even when that felony is a serious sex
offense."'
Court Contortions
Particularly conspicuous is the fact that, in the Savery and Wilson
cases, the Supreme Court found it necessary to add provisions to the
statute in order to avoid its application to the defendants. In Savery, the
court relied on a California decision" 4 to hold that application of the
Indiana statute requires that the defendant be charged with a sex offense.
By emphasizing section 9-3401 which, in part, defines sexual psychopathy
as a "mental disorder . . . coupled with criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses ... .""' and reading out of the statute the
phrase "any person . .. charged with a criminal offense except murder,
manslaughter, and [statutory] rape. .,,6 the court has avoided the
probable intent of the statute that a petition may be filed whenever a
criminal offense is charged."' By adopting the California interpretation,
112. Between 1949 and 1956, one hundred sixty persons were committed under the
statute. Cohen, supra note 18.
113. E.g., rape in the Wilson case and sodomy in the Wolfe case. The classes
created by the discriminatory application of the statute are misdemeanants and felons.
See text accompanying note 44 supra. See also M. PLoscowE, SEX AND THE LAW, 229
(1951), where the author states that "[b]ecause of the vagueness of the statutes, the
sex psychopath laws have been used primarily against minor sex offenders and in a
considerable degree have not been employed to isolate dangerous criminals."
114. People v. Haley, 42 Cal. App. 2d 618, 116 P.2d 498 (1941).
115. INrD. ANN. STAT. § 9-3401 (Bums 1956 Repl.) (emphasis added).
116. Id., § 9-3403 (emphasis added).
117. It can be argued that if the purpose of this statute is to curtail the com-
mission of sex crimes, then the proper classification of persons within the scope of
this statute are those who commit sex crimes. Thus, although the Savery court had to
read a phrase out of the statute, its holding was a good one. The argument on the other
side, however, is that persons may commit non-sex crimes, such as breaking and entering,
due to equally deviant sexual motivations. This may be true, but it would allow the
statute to be too broad in scope and it would heighten the difficulty of psychiatrists and
the courts in their determination of a person's criminal sexual psychopathy. When more
knowledge is acquired regarding the relationship between criminal acts and deviant
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which strains the terms of the Indiana statute, the court managed to
exclude the defendant from the scope of the statute."1 8
In Wilson the court seems to have added the requirement of legal
insanity to the statute in order to exclude the defendant from its scope.
The court quoted a statement from Savery that "[s]uch a proceeding
may not be used as of right to avoid punishment by one legally sane and
responsible for his acts.""' 9 The court then reasoned that since no one
questioned Wilson's sanity nor that his behavior was the result of
criminal propensities to commit sex crimes (these two factors plus a
"mental disorder" put Wilson squarely within the statute) the relevant
inquiry became, "does the evidence lead to . . . [the] single conclusion
that appellant was unable to control his sexual desires and impulses
because of a 'mental disorder' ?""' It must be interjected that Indiana's
insanity test includes the McNaghten rule plus the irresistible impulse
rule which posits the question of whether the defendant "had sufficient
will power to control his impulse to commit the act charged,"'' which is
in essence the same question reached by the court in Wilson.
After reviewing the defendant's history of sex offenses and dis-
covering evidence that he was able to control his sexual desires, the
court concluded, "[w] e cannot say that appellant, although a sex deviate,
suffered from a mental disorder of such a degree that he was without
responsibility for the rape with which he is charged.... ""' But a mental
disorder causing a lack of responsibility for the crime charged is the
basis of the insanity defense. 2 ' Thus, by invoking the terms of the
irresistible impulse test, the court was requiring a finding similar to that
of insanity prior to application of the terms of the statute. In contrast,
the doctors' reports in Haskett decided subsequent to Wilson, explicitly
state that Haskett is not insane,' 24 and yet Haskett was found to be a
sexual psychopath. The conclusion seemingly is that when the prosecuting
attorney invokes the statute the accused must be deemed sane, but when
a defendant attempts to invoke the statute he must claim insanity even
sexual motivations, it may be reasonable to extend the scope of the statute to persons
who commit any criminal offense.
118. It is not certain whether the requirement of the commission of a sex
offense applies when the prosecuting attorney invokes the statute. For a parallel
situation, see text accompanying note 125 infra.
119. 234 Ind. 632, 637, 130 N.E.2d 120, 130 (1955).
120. 236 Ind. 278, 284, 139 N.E.2d 554, 558 (1957).
121. Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 163, 139 N.E.2d 185, 193 (1956). See also
Marx v. State, 236 Ind. 455, 141 N.E.2d 126 (1957) ; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550
(1884).
122. 236 Ind. 278, 285, 139 N.E.2d 554, 558 (1957).
123. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMIINAL LAw 449, 499
(2d ed. 1960).
124. Records of the Marion Criminal Court, Division One.
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though the statute expressly excludes insane persons from its ambit. 2 '
That these decisions have not resolved many of the problems presented
by the statute is obvious.
Application of Gault
In Haskett the Indiana Supreme Court mentioned the fact that the
relator cited In re Gault.. to support his argument; the court recited the
facts of that case and the judgment of the Supreme Court, and curiously,
the court then not only neglected to discuss the applicability of Gault to
the facts at issue but also failed to state its holding.'2 7 Gault, though not
dealing with a criminal sexual psychopath statute but with an analogous
juvenile statute, is all too relevant to be ignored. The positions of Haskett
and Gault under a psychopath statute and a juvenile statute, respectively,
are strikingly similar: both committed misdemeanors; neither was crim-
inally convicted of the misdemeanor; nonetheless, both received magnified
sentences; and both were sent to institutions called something other than
a"prison." The procedures under both statutes were labeled "civil" and
thus were argued to be exempt from the requirements of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. In Gault, the Supreme Court held that
procedures pursuant to the juvenile statute were violative of due
process which required that Gault be given notice of the charge against
him, notice of a right to counsel and if necessary appointed counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and, lacking a valid confession, the
right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses at a hearing. 2 s
The Court stated, "[i]t is these instruments of due process which
enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of
opposing versions and conflicting data."'2 9 It is but a short step to the
conclusion that these aspects of due process apply with equal force to the
Indiana sexual psychopath statute.
Discretion of the Court
The court in the Wolfe decision notices another difficulty inherent
in the staute:
The term 'criminal sexual psychopath' is a legal term and not
a psychiatric term.... In practice the psychiatrists attempt to
125. According to the statute, a person is a criminal sexual psychopath if he is
"suffering from a mental disorder and is not insane or feebleminded. . . ." IND. ANN
STAT. § 9-3401 (Burns 1956 Repl.) (emphasis added).
126. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
127. State ex rel. Haskett v. Marion Criminal Court, - Ind.----, 234 N.E.2d.
636, 638, 639 (1968).
128. 387 U.S. at 30-58.
129. Id. at 21.
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correlate their psychiatric concepts with this legal term in
reaching conclusions.' It is at best a rather vague and indef-
inite category for psychiatrists as well as for lawyers."'
The term "criminal sexual psychopath" is vague not only because it is
a legal term which is not correlative to psychiatric knowledge, but also
because the definition of the term in the Indiana statute is vague. Dif-
ficulty arises from the requirement of "criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses."'' What constitutes a "propensity"-
whether an overt act or a mental disposition-and how much evidence is
required to prove a "propensity" are unanswered questions."'
One of the issues in the Savery, Wilson, and Wolfe cases was
whether the trial judge had abused his discretion in denying the benefit
of the statute to the defendants contrary to the conclusions of the examin-
ing physicians. The Savery opinion, which was quoted and cited in the
Wilson and Wolfe opinions, resolved this issue by stating that
where as in this case the law grants discretionary action without
any statutory or constitutional limits on the use of same, the
intent is to give the broadest sphere of action."' [T]he court,
in the exercise of unrestricted discretion, may be influenced by
public policy and factors outside the actual evidence pre-
sented."'
These broad discretionary powers and the fact that the trial judge
wields them without making a written statement of his findings and
reasons provoke the conclusion that enormous difficulty would be entailed
in proving that a court was "arbitrary, capricious, or influenced by
fraud,""'  and thus had abused its discretion. Certainly in the Wilson
case, the alleged arbitrariness of the trial court in finding the defendant
not to be a psychopathic person should have been more carefully scrut-
inized; the only evidence regarding the defendant's criminal sexual
psychopathy was the testimony of the two examining physicians who
both stated that the defendant was a psychopathic person."7 The basis for
130. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
131. - Ind.- , 219 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1966) (emphasis added).
132. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3401 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
133. "Propensity" is defined as "a natural inclination or bent," or "a favorable
disposition; a liking; bias." WFBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY (1960). This
definition does not reslove the difficulty with "propensity" indicated in the text.
134. 234 Ind. 632, 642, 130 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1955) (emphasis added).
135. Id. It is certainly arguable that unrestricted judicial discretion plus the power
to consider factors other than those presented to the court is not a valid exercise of
judicial power but a usurpation of it.
136. Id.
137. 236 Ind. 278, 282, 139 N.E.2d 554, 556 (1957).
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the court's concluding the defendant was not a psychopathic person may
be substantial, but without written findings the soundness of the court's
reasoning cannot be tested.
This virtually unlimited discretion contravenes recent Supreme Court
pronouncements upon comparable discretionary powers granted to courts
in juvenile proceedings. In Gault the Court stated that "[j]uvenile court
history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however bene-
volently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure"1 8 and that "[d]epartures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in
arbitrariness."'3 In Kent v. United States in which the juvenile court
waived its jurisdiction without a hearing and without a statement of its
reasons for doing so, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he statute
gives the juvenile court a substantial degree of discretion . . . [but]
[i]t does not confer upon the juvenile court a license for arbitrary
procedure."' 40 By lending approval to unbounded judicial discretion the
Indiana Supreme Court has sanctioned disregard for a most fundamental
aspect of due process.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing indicates some of the problems surrounding the
Indiana criminal sexual psychopath statute, particularly possible violations
of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The fact that persons similarly situated may be accorded markedly
different treatment, depending upon who files the initial petitions and
the court's response and resulting from application of the statute to an
accused misdemeanant but not to accused felons, leads to doubt regarding
the statute's compliance with the equal protection clause. The absence of
statutory assurances of individual rights, compounded by the Indiana
Supreme Court's approval of practically unbounded discretionary powers
of the trial court, leaves little doubt that the statute violates the due
process clause.
An effort must be made to remedy these defects. Subsequent to the
Specht decision, Colorado repealed and re-enacted the Colorado Sex
Offenders Act;41 and although the statute is not devoid of difficulties,
it does suggest some remedies for the defects of the Indiana statute.
The factors upon which a person may be indefinitely sentenced under
the Colorado statute are conviction of one of enumerated sex offenses
138. 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
139. Id., at 18, 19.
140. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
141. CoLo. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 et. seq. (1968).
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plus a finding, after psychiatric examinations and a hearing, that the
person constitutes a "threat of bodily harm to members of the public." '142
The latter poses difficulties, no doubt, but these two factors describing
the persons within the ambit of the statute are directly related to its
purpose of decreasing sex offenses. Also the problem of defining a
criminal sexual psychopath is avoided. However, the statute regrettably
ignores rehabilitation, which is an important aspect of such a statute-
not to demonstrate legislative good intent and thereby avoid due process
procedural requirements, but because without sincere effort to rehabilitate
offenders an indeterminate sentence is tantamount to incarceration for life.
The most commendable features of the Colorado statute are the
procedural rights it assures. The defendant is notified in writing of the
commencement of the proceedings, his right to counsel, his privilege
against self-incrimination, and the date set for hearing. Prior to the
hearing the district attorney is required to supply the defendant and his
counsel with a list of witnesses which the former intends to call and the
defendant and his counsel will be furnished with copies of all of the
reports filed subsequent to the psychiatric examinations and interviews.
Witnesses will be subpoenaed by the court upon a motion of the defendant
or district attorney and at the hearing the defendant has the right of
confrontation and cross-examination of all witnesses, including the exam-
ining psychiatrists. In order to indeterminately sentence the defendant,
the court's decision must be that the defendant poses, beyond a reasonable
doubt, 4 ' a threat of bodily harm to members of the public; and that
decision must be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Procedure equally rigorous is necessary to sustain constitutionally
the Indiana criminal sexual psychopath statute.
Janet Ruesch Pauls
142. Since confinement under the statute requires, in all cases, conviction of one of
the enumerated crimes plus a finding that the defendant poses a threat of bodily harm,
it may be argued that confinement under this statute, requiring both a status and an act,
is within the Powell decision and that punishment may be imposed. However, since
posing a "threat of bodily harm to members of the public" is a status, since the sole
determination for the court is whether a defendant is within this status group, and since
an indeterminate sentence is imposed as a result of membership in the status group
and not as a result of the criminal act, it seems arguable that the statute is within the
Robinson decision and that punishment may not be imposed. See note 64 supra.
143. See note 25 supra for a discussion of the burden of proof under the Indiana
statute.
